Gasgoo Munich- In the final week of May 2026, Gasgoo learned through industry channels that three power semiconductor giants—STMicroelectronics, Infineon, and Vishay—had fired off price hike notices in quick succession.

This was no isolated incident. From NXP’s early-year price adjustment to Renesas and Texas Instruments piling on, a wave of price increases has washed over the semiconductor sector for nearly six months.

Caught between a tsunami of upstream costs and fierce price wars downstream, the auto industry is being forced toward a critical juncture where it must make a choice.

Price Hike Letters Arrive En Masse, Resetting Costs Across the Semiconductor Manufacturing System

These three letters, combined with multiple rounds of adjustments that landed in the first half of the year, point to a single conclusion: the semiconductor industry is undergoing a systemic cost reset.

In a May 28 notice, STMicroelectronics acknowledged that while it had implemented a price adjustment earlier this year, “inflationary pressure remains unabated, with raw materials, transportation, and labor costs climbing further.”

The company was forced to extend price hikes to product lines previously untouched. This staggered strategy—raising prices on some products early in the year and others mid-year—suggests cost pressures are not a one-off shock but a long-term accumulation.

The notice Vishay sent on May 29 carried a sharper sense of urgency.

It detailed the company’s previous efforts: a February letter to customers explaining economic pressures, followed by an all-out internal drive to absorb rising costs.

Yet “key raw materials, especially precious metals vital to power semiconductor manufacturing, have experienced sharp and sustained price increases globally.”

Ultimately, it had to implement emergency price adjustments for its MOSFET and IC product lines, effective immediately with subsequent shipments. The word “emergency” lays bare the severity of the situation.

Just three days prior, Infineon pointed the finger directly at geopolitics in its own correspondence.

“The global semiconductor industry continues to face immense cost pressures, primarily driven by geopolitical tensions,” the company stated, triggering cost increases “across the full value chain, including energy, raw materials, transportation, and services.”

Infineon also admitted that product demand is surging far beyond expectations, forcing a significant acceleration in investment to expand capacity. That massive investment, the company implied, must be shared with customers.

Viewed together with the record of price hikes since the start of the year, these three letters reveal a complete picture of the industry.

This is not the isolated predicament of a single company, but a collective movement across the entire semiconductor supply chain.

In January, NXP led the way by executing price hikes of 5% to 15% on automotive MCU and processor lines. Almost simultaneously, Renesas Electronics began its annual adjustments, citing “continuously rising wafer foundry costs and packaging material prices hitting record highs.”

In March, Texas Instruments quietly raised prices on select automotive analog chips by 8% to 12%. By May, the three giants were moving in unison, covering nearly all major global suppliers of automotive-grade chips. The retreat for automakers—switching suppliers to weather the storm—has been completely cut off.

The drivers behind these price hikes are highly complex.

Prices for precious metals like palladium, gold, and platinum have hit record highs amid geopolitical conflicts and supply shortages; global shipping costs are on the rise again; and basic materials like ultra-high-purity chemical reagents, silicon wafers, and photoresists are climbing in unison. This is not a fluctuation in a single cost item, but a comprehensive, across-the-board upward curve.

A deeper shift lies in the fact that semiconductor companies have reached the limit of their ability to absorb costs internally.

Vishay stated bluntly that it “can no longer offset costs through internal measures,” while Infineon admitted it “can no longer absorb them through internal channels.” Such language is extremely rare in external communications from major semiconductor manufacturers.

Profit cushions have been completely exhausted. When TSMC led the way in 2025 by raising advanced process foundry prices by 5% to 8%, and UMC, GlobalFoundries, and other mature process foundries followed suit, costs inevitably flooded downstream.

Notably, nearly every semiconductor company has bundled “continued supply” with “accepting price hikes” in their notices.

Vishay promised it is “actively investing in front- and back-end capacity to secure your production lines,” Infineon emphasized “significantly accelerating investment to expand capacity,” and NXP similarly stressed “ensuring long-term supply security” in its January notice.

This logic leaves automakers with little room to refuse: you can reject the price hike, but you cannot guarantee future supply security.

Yet, this round of price hikes may be far from over.

A veteran in the semiconductor distribution sector told Gasgoo: “The price hike letters arriving now actually reflect cost structures from six to nine months ago. Precious metal prices are still climbing, 12-inch silicon wafer supply will be even tighter next year, and new rounds of foundry price negotiations are set to begin in the second half. Given the pace of upstream transmission, it is highly likely there will be another window for price adjustments.”

The source added, “The intensive moves in May look more like a catch-up for products that hadn’t seen price increases yet.”

In other words, the price hike notices landing on automakers’ desks may be just the tip of the iceberg. Heavier bills are still on the way.

This wave of price hikes is fundamentally different from the “chip shortage” of 2020 to 2022. The previous event was a short-term disruption caused by the pandemic throwing supply and demand out of sync; prices eventually fell as capacity recovered.

This time, it is a structural cost reconstruction following the tearing of global supply chains by geopolitics—a repricing of the manufacturing system against the backdrop of deglobalization. Once started, there is no turning back.

For the automotive industry, power semiconductors are arguably the hardest components to replace.

The number of chips in a smart electric vehicle has surged from the hundreds in traditional internal combustion cars to between 1,000 and 2,000. IGBTs and MOSFETs, in particular, are the heart of the electric drive system.

Replacing any single chip requires six months to two years of rigorous validation, leaving automakers with almost no bargaining power when facing price hikes. Supply chain estimates suggest this round of semiconductor price increases alone will add 500 to 1,000 yuan in chip costs per vehicle. If another round hits in the second half, that figure will only swell.

Li Bin’s ‘10,000 Yuan Bill’ Exposes the Hidden Wound of Spiraling Vehicle Costs

On May 28, NIO CEO Li Bin noted during a media roundtable for the ES9 that rising raw material costs—including nickel, cobalt, and lithium carbonate—have added over 10,000 yuan to the cost of a single vehicle since the start of the year.

Image Source: NIO

He pointed out that commodities and memory chips affect not only the auto industry but also sectors with faster growth and deeper pockets, leaving carmakers with little bargaining power. Memory prices have risen this year and haven’t come back down, while cost increases from raw materials are unlikely to ease in the short term. Companies have no choice but to absorb these costs themselves.

That 10,000 yuan figure essentially wipes out the net profit per vehicle for the vast majority of automakers.

The financial reports of domestic listed automakers make for grim reading. Annual reports for 2025 and first-quarter reports for 2026 show that net profit per vehicle for mainstream domestic brands generally hovers between 2,000 and 8,000 yuan.

Even for the few top-tier companies with the strongest profitability, exceeding 10,000 yuan in net profit per vehicle is no easy feat. Li Bin’s admission amounts to this: raw material costs alone have devoured the entire profit most automakers make on a single car.

More worth considering is that the “raw materials” he cited likely refer primarily to battery materials and body metals, without fully accounting for rising indirect costs like chips, logistics, and energy.

Breaking down this “10,000 yuan bill,” the composition is more complex than outsiders might imagine. Battery materials remain the biggest source of bleeding.

After briefly falling below 100,000 yuan per ton at the end of 2024, battery-grade lithium carbonate prices have oscillated between 150,000 and 200,000 yuan since the second half of 2025.

For a pure electric model equipped with a 70 kWh battery pack, lithium carbonate alone adds 3,000 to 5,000 yuan in costs compared to the low point.

Lithium hexafluorophosphate, a core material for electrolytes, has fluctuated in tandem, while cobalt and nickel in cathode materials have held firm due to tightening export policies in Indonesia and unstable supply in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Overall, battery pack costs have increased by 6,000 to 8,000 yuan compared to their lows.

Copper and aluminum prices are also weighing heavily on automakers. A single pure electric vehicle uses between 80 and 100 kilograms of copper—four times that of a traditional internal combustion car.

Global copper prices have consistently stayed above $10,000 per ton, up more than 20% from the 2023 average. Institutions like Goldman Sachs predict they could break $12,000 in the second half of 2026.

Driven by lightweighting needs, aluminum alloy usage per vehicle generally exceeds 250 kilograms. Combined, copper and aluminum add another 2,000 to 3,000 yuan to the cost of each car.

Rising chip costs are a new variable added this round, and one that is still spreading.

The MCUs and processors covered by NXP’s January price hike are central to body control and smart cockpits, while Renesas’s adjustments involve its R-Car and RH850 series MCUs.

Texas Instruments targeted automotive analog chips in March, while the intensive price adjustments by Infineon, Vishay, and STMicroelectronics in May have fully unleashed cost pressures for power devices.

More hidden costs include logistics and energy. The Red Sea crisis has pushed container freight rates back up, with the cost of a standard container from Asia to Europe surpassing $10,000.

Domestic industrial electricity prices underwent structural increases in 2025, putting direct pressure on energy-intensive stamping, welding, and painting processes. When all factors are considered, the actual increase in comprehensive cost per vehicle likely far exceeds 10,000 yuan.

Even more lethal is the time lag effect. The automotive product pricing cycle is lengthy; a model typically takes 18 to 24 months from project approval and pricing to launch.

The pricing baseline for the vast majority of models currently on the market is still stuck in the cost structure of 2024 or earlier. With actual manufacturing costs up by more than 10,000 yuan while sticker prices remain frozen, every car delivered means the company is silently bleeding.

Some automakers have begun trying to stop the bleeding in various ways. Some are cutting configurations, swapping imported chips for domestic solutions, or replacing leather seats with synthetic leather.

Others are mining profits from software subscriptions, attempting to offset hardware losses through paid OTA upgrades, or demanding Tier 1 suppliers share the burden of price hikes.

But these measures are like patching holes in a dam—they may delay a breach but cannot stop the water level from rising. For automotive-grade power devices and high-end MCUs, the market share of domestic chips remains limited, making effective substitution difficult in the short term.

Even more alarming is that rising costs are dramatically widening the gap in survival capabilities between automakers of different sizes.

Giants selling millions of vehicles annually can leverage their scale to negotiate milder increases, while startups selling 100,000 units have almost no bargaining power against dominant semiconductor firms. This storm of rising costs will inevitably accelerate the exit of weaker brands.

Overlaying the dense semiconductor price hikes with Li Bin’s 10,000 yuan bill reveals a clear chain of transmission.

Geopolitical conflicts drive up energy and precious metal prices → costs for silicon wafers, chemicals, and packaging materials climb → wafer foundry prices rise → chip suppliers send price hike letters → Tier 1 suppliers feel the squeeze → vehicle costs spiral out of control → profits hit zero or turn negative. This chain is tightly interlocked, and the final outlet for all this pressure can only be the sticker price.

Profits Hit Bottom as Price Hikes Prove Difficult: The Auto Industry Is Being Pushed to the Brink

With per-vehicle costs rising by over 10,000 yuan, the latest data shared by Cui Dongshu, secretary-general of the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA), shows the auto industry’s profit margin fell further to 3.4% in the first four months of 2026. A simple equation faces all automakers: raise prices or lose money. But reality is far more complex than arithmetic.

Image Source: Cui Dongshu

In an interview, Cui noted: “The profit margin in the first quarter was only 3.2%, which is relatively low. Historically, a 9% margin around 2015 was considered high; it has now slid all the way to about 3%. In contrast, profit margins in other industries remain relatively stable.”

From 9% to 3.2%, this downward trajectory over a decade means the auto industry’s ability to generate cash has been compressed to the limit.

Cui further pointed out that the industry is undergoing “changes unseen in a century,” the core feature of which is a shift in profit distribution rights.

“The concept of the automaker as king has been replaced by the upstream as king,” Cui analyzed. “Raw material prices are rising across the board, and profits in the EV supply chain are particularly high, causing industry profits to shift upstream. Faced with extraordinary R&D investments and difficult market conditions, automakers are left with extremely thin profits.”

This assessment hits the Achilles’ heel of the current auto industry. In the past, automakers were the absolute core of the supply chain, holding pricing power and profit distribution rights. Today, upstream sectors like battery suppliers, chipmakers, and precious metal miners take the lion’s share of profits, leaving automakers to fall from value chain “distributors” to mere recipients.

Even more worrying is that there is no sign of this “upstream as king” dynamic reversing in the short term. Semiconductor suppliers speak through price hike letters, and lithium giants speak through auction prices; automakers, with few chips to bargain with at the negotiating table, have little choice but to accept.

For the past two years, the Chinese auto market has been mired in a price war. Persisting since early 2024, this conflict has covered nearly every segment, from A-class sedans to luxury SUVs.

Pricing for new models is generally 10% to 15% lower than the previous generation. With passenger vehicle capacity utilization having fallen below 60%, no one dares to mention price increases lightly. The first to move risks rapidly losing market share and triggering a chain reaction in capital markets.

This dilemma is most brutal for new energy vehicle (NEV) makers.

Traditional automakers can subsidize EV losses through after-sales service, financing, and even internal combustion engine vehicle profits, whereas most NEV brands rely heavily on new car sales for revenue.

When per-vehicle gross margins are swallowed by costs, they have almost no other profit pools to draw from. Even more severe is that the NEV market landscape is far from settled; any price increase could give competitors an opening to launch a fatal attack.

Thus, an absurd stalemate has formed: the entire industry is bleeding, yet no one dares to be the first to cry out in pain.

Automakers would rather slash marketing budgets, cut non-core businesses, delay R&D projects, or even lay off staff and cut wages than touch the sensitive cake of sticker prices.

But this endurance has a limit, depending on two variables: the speed of continued cost increases and the depth of corporate cash reserves. Currently, the former shows no sign of slowing, while the latter is rapidly depleting by the month for many companies.

Signs of a turning point quietly emerged in the first half of 2026.

Promotional intensity for some popular models at launch has visibly contracted, with actual transaction prices rising by 3,000 to 6,000 yuan compared to the beginning of the year.

Some brands have quietly raised guide prices under the guise of “annual model updates,” with increases ranging from 2,000 to 8,000 yuan. In the used car market, the resale value of nearly new vehicles has seen a rare rebound—a sign that the pricing baseline for new cars is shifting subtly upward.

However, this recovery is destined to be fraught with thorns. Chinese consumers are among the most price-sensitive in major global markets.

Against a backdrop of slowing economic growth and weakening consumer confidence, any price hike could trigger further contraction in demand. Automakers could then face the worst of both worlds: prices rise, sales fall, and profits remain elusive.

A deeper concern is that this round of cost increases has strong structural characteristics.

Geopolitical tensions show no sign of ending, with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and instability in the Middle East continuing to disrupt energy and precious metal supplies.

The global race for semiconductor capacity is accelerating, with nations pouring cost-no-object investments into local production in the name of security. Amid deglobalization, trade barriers and regionalized supply chains are further driving up manufacturing and logistics costs. The baseline for automotive manufacturing costs is undergoing an irreversible rise.

The industry can no longer hope for costs to fall back; it must figure out how to rebuild profitability on a higher cost foundation.

This requires technological innovations—such as integrated electric drive systems and cell-to-body technology—to achieve material savings and efficiency leaps. It demands a restructuring of supply chains to foster alternatives, and, crucially, an industry consolidation to clear excess capacity.

Market share and pricing power for the survivors will eventually be restored, but it will be a painful and prolonged process.

From the perspective of the semiconductor industry, however, this round of price hikes is not without an end point.

As TSMC’s new plants in Japan, the U.S., and Germany, Intel’s expansion in Europe and the U.S., and Samsung’s massive investment in Texas gradually come online, global chip capacity is expected to see a concentrated release between 2027 and 2028.

Supply tensions may ease then, and prices could retreat from their highs. But waiting for that day requires sufficient cash reserves and strategic fortitude—not every company will survive the darkness before dawn.

Looking back from mid-2026, the auto industry is walking an increasingly narrow tightrope.

From NXP’s early-year price hike to Renesas and Texas Instruments piling on, to the synchronized move by the three giants in May, price increase notices have arrived like snowflakes.

Battery and metal costs remain high, logistics and energy costs continue to erode gross margins, and sticker prices remain paralyzed by market competition. This cost fire, burning for over half a year, will—like a rising tide—inundate automakers’ profit defenses inch by inch.

Epilogue

From NXP sounding the alarm in January to the intensive action by the three giants in late May, the semiconductor price hikes of 2026 have spread from sporadic sparks to a raging wildfire.

Li Bin’s 10,000 yuan bill and the industry’s 3% profit margin red line piece together a picture of the structural upheaval reshaping the auto industry. For the past decade, consumers grew accustomed to cars getting cheaper; now, that downward price curve is being forcibly bent upward.

Chip suppliers have collectively declared an end to “covering the difference,” leaving automakers gasping for air in the vice between costs and market pressure. “Fire-sale” promotions are quietly exiting the stage, and the golden age of car price cuts may be drawing to a temporary close.

This is not the end, but the prologue to a new phase of the game. Global supply chain restructuring, leaps in technology roadmaps, and shifting consumer expectations will become deeply entangled. Only those who can find a new value anchor in this cost tsunami will survive the cycle and live to see the next spring.