Iraq’s participation in international climate-focused events, particularly the annual COP meetings, could suggest that the country’s decision-makers recognize climate change and are committed to a clean energy transition. However, while the Iraqi government claims to be transitioning towards cleaner energy, it remains unwilling to admit any fault in the climate crisis and continues to actively misrepresent the environmental impact of its oil industry. Moreover, Iraq is one of the strongest opponents of the reduction or phasing-out of fossil fuels proposed by the draft final agreement of COP28 in November 2023,AFP, “Iraq Tells COP28 It Rejects Any Fossil Fuel Phase-Out”, 10 December 2023, available at https://www.barrons.com/news/iraq-tells-cop28-it-rejects-any-fossil-fuel-phase-out-d6fbcd69 while the Ministry of Environment, which is responsible for achieving Iraq’s climate goals and minimizing the escalating environmental impact of the hydrocarbon industry, has firmly refused to touch fossil fuels citing harms to the country’s economy.
Instead, the Iraqi government’s environmental doctrine seems to consist of engaging in international climate venues to secure international funding for clean environmental solutions that never develop, while continuing to increase oil and gas production.
Playing the Climate Game: Misinformation and Unimplementable Plans
Official reports of the Iraqi government have promoted misleading narratives and misinformation about oil production. Such is the case of the 2023 Climate Change in Iraq: Current Challenges and Future Resilience, which claims that the level of emissions in Iraq has not changed for about two decades, remaining constant between 2002 and 2020. Issued by the Permanent National Committee for Climate Change Follow-up, this document also states that the extractive and petrochemical industries are going through a period of “sectoral stagnation” and that the government is not working to expand oil production.Ministry of Planning, “Climate Change in Iraq: The Challenge of Reality and the Resilience of the Future, Permanent National Committee for Climate Change Follow-up”, 2023, pp. 36 and 59. Yet such a representation contradicts the government’s aggressive oil expansion plans, which in recent years have included licensing rounds to reach eight million barrels per day by 2027.Reuters, “Iraq Plans to Increase Oil Production to 8 mln bpd by 2027 – Minister”, 10 August 2021, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-plans-increase-oil-production-8-mln-bpd-by-2027-minister-2021-08-10/ Furthermore, in a 2014 paper submitted to the 10th Arab Energy Conference, the Iraqi government itself acknowledged that “Iraq’s energy consumption and production has almost quadrupled over the past three decades, and as of 2010, the primary energy demand for the country as a whole was about 38 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe), or 3 tons of oil equivalent per capita.”Country paper of the Republic of Iraq submitted to the 10th Arab Energy Conference, Abu Dhabi, December 2014, available at https://goo.su/ioCTpR0
Government reports also tend to omit any reference to pollutants from oil extraction and gas flaring, despite the International Energy Agency’s assertion that Iraq is responsible for 8% of global methane emissions from oil and gas,UNAMI, “Iraq Mulls Tackling Its Methane Problem And Reaping Major Benefits Along the Way”, 30 September 2020, available at https://goo.su/GrVtg and despite the fact that Iraq currently ranks 32nd out of 215 countries in terms of annual total carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and industry.Global Carbon Budget (2024) – with major processing by Our World in Data. “Annual CO₂ emissions – GCB” [dataset]. Global Carbon Project, “Global Carbon Budget” [original data], available at https://ourworldindata.org/co2-emissions-metrics
As for the environmental policies that successive Iraqi governments have presented to international institutions working on climate, these are driven by international incentives rather than by a national vision or strategy. As a result of international pressure, and as a way to access climate funding,Alhurra TV, “Iraq Wants ‘priority’ in International Climate Finance”, 23 September 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/nF0uZ Iraq has worked to establish national entities and documents to facilitate the implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) such as the Nationally Determined Contributions of Iraq (NDC),Nationally Determined Contribution of Iraq (NDC). https://goo.su/MSXcs7a the climate change adaptation and emission reduction plan submitted every five years to the United Nations Climate Change Secretariat. Yet Iraq’s proposed policies are often dependent on, or a reaction to, international frameworks and funding streams – a dynamic that Iraqi governments can also use to deflect international blame when they are slow to enact change.
In 2011, Iraq established the National Permanent Committee on Climate Change under the Ministry of Planning, as there was no separate ministry for the environment then. For over a decade, the committee’s activities did not produce any operational changes or outputs – a situation that paralleled the fact that the environment portfolio had no separate budgetary line and was attached to the Ministry of Health. Iraqi News Agency, “Environment Announces the Formation of a National Climate Change Committee”, 24 July 2024, available at https://goo.su/EUSabUO  in preparation for COP28, and this restructuring included creating the Ministry of Environment as a separate entity.
In 2013, Iraq drafted a national environmental protection strategy, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This strategy was supposed to be implemented by 2017 but was neglected for a decade before it was kickstarted again through UN action when a new strategy was introduced. Yet, the new 2023-2028 strategy does not lay out how the plan will be funded and implemented.
In 2015, Iraq joined the Climate and Clean Air Coalition in accordance with the NDC, as part of a politicized and conditional deal to cut carbon dioxide emissions between 2030 and 2035. Under this framework, Iraq has committed to voluntarily reducing emissions by only 1 to 2% – highlighting the government’s denial of the magnitude of its fossil fuel. As for conditional mitigation, in 2021 the Iraqi government agreed to a 15% target, conditional on the country receiving US$100 billion in international donations for emissions reduction, sector adaptation, and security.UNAMI, “As Iraq Joins the Paris Agreement, UN Calls for Further Support to Help the Country Adapt,” December 2021, available at https://goo.su/XrUdp
The government’s National Development Plan (2018-2022) recognized that the country faces a “double negative relationship between environmental degradation and armed conflicts”Ministry of Planning, National Development Plan, June 2018, available at https://goo.su/Jg1vY but stopped short of calling for a national climate solidarity system to address the effects of climate change, water crisis, and drought. Nor did it set up funding streams for environmental damage.
The Iraqi cabinet that assumed functions in October 2022 offered no proposals to confront climate change and environmental degradation, except for a single reference in the sixth item of the eighth axis (agriculture and water resources) to “link climate change and its repercussions on Iraq’s environment to foreign relations with other states, international organizations, and the COP.” This passing reference and linkage reveals how environmental issues for Iraq’s decision-makers are not a budgetary priority but rather figure primarily to interact with international institutions and deflect blame.
For its part, the Ministry of Environment has focused on bureaucratic reforms. In 2024, it proposed six procedural pathways to mitigate environmental and climate impact:
- Amending the Law on Protecting and Improving the Environment (Law No. 27 of 2009). Considering the age of the current law, the government is working on drafting a new law that aligns with international and UN frameworks and submitted a draft of the new legislation to parliament for the first reading on 1 October 2024.
- The Ministry of Environment National Strategy 2013-2017.
- The National Strategy for Combating Environmental Pollution 2028-2023 [government document not in the public domain].
- Activating the annual plans of the Ministry of Environment’s sectoral units to measure and assess oil pollution at the sites of extractive activity.
- Acceding to international agreements, such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Basel Convention on the Management of Hazardous Wastes, as well as drafting national legislation in line with them, and moving towards internationally funded plans to reduce pollution.
- Imposing “environmental requirements” on all activities related to fossil fuels and requiring stakeholders to implement pollution mitigation measures.
In the year since these six environmental pathways were announced, there has been little progress on implementation, with efforts remaining limited to internal governmental communications and notifications to international organizations. This lack of progress points both to the flaws in government structures and the indifference on the part of environmental decision-makers, including at the highest level (the Prime Minister’s Office), which could impose protective measures by executive decision.
The fourth and sixth of the above proposed environmental pathways assume the existence of a monitoring mechanism for the oil industry’s pollution. Such an assumption clashes with the prevailing climate of environmental repression that forecloses holding the oil sector accountable. Environmental inspection teams have been prevented from accessing sites where pollution rates are steadily rising, environmental advocacy is routinely silenced, and activists and government officials have been arrested on corruption charges.In May 2024, Basra’s environment director Radi Mohammed Radi was arrested on corruption charges just one month after his appointment. The main motive was that Radi had filed a lawsuit against oil companies in the Majnoon field due to increasing cases of cancer among local residents and workers in the field. See Basra 365, “About ‘Cancer’ and Oil Mafias”. See also Basra 365. “Days Before His Arrest.. Basra Environment Director Filed a Lawsuit Against Majnoon Companies”, available at https://goo.su/T2pE In this climate, the ministry’s pathways remain unimplementable.
The government and the spectrum of beneficiaries within the political system argue that the failure of official climate actions is due to the funding gap that hinders the achievement of Iraq’s sustainability goals. The least costly scenario is estimated at $290 billion.The Iraq Prime Minister Speech before the Sustainable Development Goals Summit in New York, September 2023, available at https://goo.su/49Hav The financial losses of the war on ISIS and the repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic have devastated the country. The pandemic has destroyed the country’s ability to direct public funds towards reforming the environmental sector, which requires an overhaul of the services sector first. With a destroyed infrastructure in the north and west and dilapidated in the center and south, it seems impossible for Iraq to face the effects of climate change.Safaa Khalaf, “Reconstruction of Iraq’s ‘Devastated’ Areas: A Ruin Investment Farm”, Al-Safir Al-Arabi, March 2019, available at https://goo.su/nfPQ
In addition, the number of rescue measures put in place seems to have little potential impact. These include the World Bank’s proposed Clean Investment Survival Vision of $233 billion by 2040 to enable Iraq to close priority development gaps and embark on an inclusive green growth path, as well as an initial adaptation package and operational spending to address water scarcity of $70 billion until to 2040.World Bank Group, The Iraq Country Climate and Development Report, November 2022. https://goo.su/0UvWJ Both goals appear unattainable with the growing level of financial depletion to cover the costs of public services salaries and operations.
This is further compounded by the pervasive corruption and misuse of public funds and the financing of formal and informal armed groups that continue to grow. The second national voluntary report on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals did not mention the goal of improving the environment and climate change,Second National Voluntary Report on the Sustainable Development Goals, Ministry of Planning – National Committee for Sustainable Development, July 2021. https://goo.su/UQNwI1 and the government’s allocation to support the UN’s fourth strategy in Iraq among its five goals, concerned with strengthening natural resources, disaster risk management, and resilience to climate change, is a small micro-funding of only $255 million,UNAMI, Annual results report by the United Nations Country Team, March 2022. https://goo.su/H74IRcp which expired two years ago.
In a rare gesture by the political system to diagnose the dysfunctional aspects of dealing with the environmental crisis, the interim government led by Mustafa al-Kadhimi (May 2020 to October 2022) claimed, in what it called the White Paper for Financial Reform, that “Iraq has a strong desire to rebuild the destroyed cities according to modern building systems to become environmentally friendly and sustainable green cities to be living witnesses of peace within Iraqi society to encourage the use of renewable energy and green construction to ensure sustainability in the face of the risks of climate change.”Government of Iraq, Final Report of the Financial Reform Emergency Cell (White Paper), October 2020, available at http://iraqieconomists.net/ar/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/10/2020-10-11-2350-WP.pdf However, the implementation measures proposed for the paper continued to revolve around politicized environmental measures structurally linked to the carbonized rentier economy.
Despite repeated references to the need to reduce dependence on oil rents, as opposed to increasing the contribution of non-oil sectors to national output, the fiscal reform proposed in the paper remained dependent on fossil imports. The plan did not indicate how to revitalize the non-oil sector through low-carbon government financing or changing market and investment regulations to be more attractive. Instead, it proposed cutting government spending by 30% per year to reach self-financing in 2024 by defunding a wide range of non-oil public sector companies that are supposed to target domestic consumption to reduce dependence on excessive imports that drain the financial abundance, as well as maximizing government imports through clean sources.
Despite government announcements to adopt a proactive environmental pathway at the Iraq Climate Conference held in Basra, the city most affected by carbon-intensive production in March 2023, Iraq has not allocated a clear budget or funds to support its adaptive environmental pathways, although it has launched four unprecedented budgets between 2021 and 2025 estimated at around $400 billion.In Iraq’s three-year budget (2023, 2024 and 2025), the government allocated approximately million per year only to the Ministry of Environment, the first planned budget for the environmental sector in the history of Iraqi governments, of which only 48% was spent in 2023 for operational necessities (mostly staff salaries), while no environmental project or climate initiative was implemented, so the achievement in the investment plan was zero. The Ministry of Environment is likely to be given the same level of federal funds for 2024 and 2025. The Ministry of Environment is the smallest governmental structure; its human resources are limited to only 3,308 employees across Iraq. Its share of foreign loans amounted to only about US million, without announcing the form of the environmental projects. In Iraq’s three-year budget (2023, 2024 and 2025), the government allocated approximately $68 million per year only to the Ministry of Environment, the first planned budget for the environmental sector in the history of Iraqi governments, of which only 48% was spent in 2023 for operational necessities (mostly staff salaries), while no environmental project or climate initiative was implemented. The Ministry of Environment is the smallest governmental structure with limited human resources, with 3,308 employees across Iraq.
Green Finance: A New Frontier for Corruption
In December 2023, during COP28 in Dubai, Iraq’s Central Bank and Environment Ministry jointly announced the establishment of the Green Bank of Iraq for Sustainable Development. The new bank was said to count on 400 billion dinars in funding, of which 350 billion would be invested in green projects by the private sector between 2024 and 2027.Kirkuk Al-Aan, “Announcement of the Establishment of the First Iraqi Bank to Mitigate the Effects of Climate Change,” 7 December 2023, available at https://kirkuknow.com/ar/news/69811 Among other goals, the bank was meant to create100,000 jobs in green development projects.Ibid.
Today, the fate of the bank is shrouded in mystery. Government circles refuse to disclose information related to its establishment and proposed projects, and there is no information on the addresses of its administrative offices or contact details for its officials. Al-Alam Al-Jadeed, “Climate Change and Water Scarcity Push Iraq to Establish a ‘Green Bank’”, 19 September 2024, available at https://shorturl.at/xRVH7 Meanwhile, an anonymous source at the Central Bank of Iraq, the party responsible for operating the new bank, stated that “bureaucracy, lack of governmental seriousness, lack of climate governance, favoritism, party pressure, conflict over financial shares between political groups, as well as the growing lack of confidence among citizens in the state environmental policies are all reasons that hinder the operation of the bank.”Ibid.
In 2021, the central bank issued green bonds in the amount of 859 billion.Al Sabah, “Central Bank Announces the Establishment of the Green Bank for Sustainable Development”, 11 December 2023, available at https://alsabaah.iq/88656-.html These financial instruments are in theory meant to raise funds for projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and promoting environmental sustainability. There is no information on how these bonds were issued in Iraq nor who acquired them, and the funds have evaporated without a trace.
These developments indicate that economic solutions associated with climate change have become a new profit zone inside Iraq’s political economy where corruption is rampant.
In 2023, the Iraqi government also announced the creation of the General Carbon Economics Company to commodify the emissions of the oil and industrial sectors and offer them for sale as carbon bonds to support financing the public budget.Iraqi News Agency, “Government Official: Carbon Bonds Will Support Iraq’s Budget” 12 July 2024, available at https://www.ina.iq/212474–.html The company was established with a capital of 10 billion Iraqi dinars under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment, with the stated goal of transferring 95% of the company’s profits to the public treasury.Al-Marbad Radio, “Minister of Oil Announces the Launch of the First Project Funded by Carbon Bonds”, 23 October 2023, available at https://goo.su/miHtz Profits are meant to be generated through the registration of carbon certificates in coordination with the UNFCCC.See the certificate and statement of incorporation of the Company Published in the Official Iraqi Facts, No. 4764, March 2024. p. 18. Carbon commoditization to reduce emissions requires not only defining clear and sincere public policies for a climate rescue measure but also overcoming the challenges of the country’s political economy.Hania Dawood, “Balancing Act: Political Economy and the Pursuit of Ambitious Carbon Pricing in Developing Countries”, World Bank, 11 September 2024, available at https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/climatechange/balancing-act–political-economy-and-the-pursuit-of-ambitious-ca
Iraq at COP29
Ahead of COP29, the Iraqi government launched extensive propaganda and public relations campaigns about the seriousness of Iraq’s contribution to the annual meeting. When Iraq was selected to represent the Arab Group in the technical areas of negotiation at the Bonn Climate Change Conference, this was reported as “a major technical, political, and diplomatic achievement for Iraq.”
Iraq prepared four key documents to participate in COP29 [see Figure 1], including the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Plan, the Technology Needs Assessment, the Second National Communication on Climate Change in Iraq, and the National Green Climate Fund Program.
Figure 1 – Documents submitted to COP29 by Iraq:
| Document |
Description |
| Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Plan (NAMA)
|
A document not yet in the public domain but prepared based on international and UN perceptions as part of fulfilling Iraq’s bureaucratic environmental commitments in preparation for COP29, pre-coordinated by the UNFCCC. |
| Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) |
The TNA targets prioritized, most vulnerable sectors that offer quantifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Funding from the international community’s acceptance of the Iraqi document may contribute to updating Iraq’s national emissions inventory, which was last completed in 1997.
In April 2019, Iraq requested 18 months of funding worth $374,000 to complete the document, to be managed by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
|
| Iraq’s Second National Communication on Climate Change |
The document is in the process of being finalized, but it is based on the first National Communication on Climate Change in Iraq, which was issued in 2016. |
| National Green Climate Fund Program (NDA) |
Iraq formed the NDA in June 2018 to leverage international climate finance and address environmental challenges. With a grant from the GCF, the government began preparing a two-year National Readiness Program (NRP) for 2018-2019 but failed to do so as well. |
Six initial observations can be made about Iraq’s strategy for COP29.
- These documents lack a holistic analysis of the multiplicity of local environmental issues – which means they do not consider the multiple levels of the crisis and their potential severity. Instead, they are designed by the logic of a vicious cycle of bureaucratic pledges: preparing documents to obtain more funds to prepare more documents.
- The Iraqi negotiating team and the Ministry of Environment neglected – perhaps deliberately – a series of documents of greater importance than those mentioned above, given that they paint a more comprehensive picture of environmental degradation and climatic exposures. These include: the National Strategy for Environmental Protection and Improvement in Iraq (2024-2030);UNFCCC, “Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions”, available at https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/nationally-appropriate-mitigation-actions the National Adaptation Plan for Combating Climate Change (NAP),According to the NDC, Iraq, with international help and pressure, attempted to address its environmental failures by launching the “National Adaptation Plan to Combat Climate Change (NAP)” in late 2019, over a period of 36 months, in cooperation with UNEP and with reduced funding from the Green Climate Fund (GCF), disproportionate to the size of the environmental disaster, worth .5 million, with the aim of developing a resilience policy for all priority vulnerable national sectors within three years to minimize potential risks, find effective ways to sustain water resources and address acute water scarcity and deteriorating water quality. However, the plan did not achieve any of its objectives within its timeframe, so UNEP restructured it again in 2022, this time aiming to strengthen institutional capacity to support decision-makers by providing climate projections, scenarios, risk assessments and data. See Adaptation Planning for the Iraq Republic, United Nations Environment Programme, Green Climate Fund, December 2019, available at https://goo.su/Z7xf and Iraq on track in the preparation of its Climate Change National Adaptation Plan, UNEP, 28 July 2022, available at https://goo.su/XUNMizW prepared in accordance with the NDC; the Local Climate Change Adaptation Plan for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, launched in May 2024; and Iraq’s Sustainable Development Plan 2023, launched in 2019.
- Iraq´s negotiating track at COP29, in line with the government’s environmental doctrine, excluded any mention of the environmental impact of the oil industry and gas flaring. No document was prepared concerning carbon emissions and the heavy pollution levels that have been linked to poor air quality, chronic pulmonary diseases, and cancer. There was also no mention of the industrial environmental load of public sector industries responsible for 95% of air pollution, despite the Ministry of Environment’s involvement in the National Initiative for Energy Support and Emissions Reduction, formed in August 2021 (on the initiative of the Ministry of Electricity and adopted by the Ministry of Environment with the approval of the Council of Ministers), which is the largest bureaucratically organized government effort related to climate action, involving 540 teams and 2,250 government employees.
- The negotiating track for COP29 also excluded a national position on regional and geopolitical elements of the climate crisis, especially concerning the water dossier and the destructive practices and policies of two upstream countries, Iran and Turkey. No documentation was presented on the devastating impact of water scarcity on security,Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance, “Assessing Security Sector Roles in Climate and Environmental Security in Iraq”, March 2024, available at https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-05/undp_iq_stocktakingstudy-iraq-undp_ar.pdf see also: EUAM, “Iraq Supports the Integration of Climate Security Within Iraq’s National Security Strategy”, The European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq, 29 February 2024. migration,See Norwegian Refugee Council, Insufficient and Unfair: Water Scarcity and Displacement in Iraq, October 2023, available at https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/water-scarcity-and-displacement-in-iraq/water-scarcity-and-displacement-in-iraq—arabic.pdf. the well-being of women,Iraqi Women and Climate Change, UNFPA Report 2023. or the future of children and youth.See UNICEF and Iraq’s Ministry of Environment “Impacts of Climate Change on Children and Youth in Iraq”, 2023, available at https://www.unicef.org/iraq/media/3521/file/CLAC%20-Final%20Full%20Report-%20English.pdf.pdf
- Civil society organizations concerned with environmental advocacy were absent from the government’s preparation and consultations ahead of COP29. The Ministry of Environment and other governmental entities concerned with the climateAl Masra, “Amedi: Environment Lays Out a Comprehensive Roadmap to Prepare for COP29”, 10 July 2024, available at https://almasra.iq/89929/ did not involve environmental organizations in drafting Iraq’s agenda for the COP; hence the absence of the voice of affected urban and rural communities. At the same time, NGOs concerned with climate change were not active in preparing a parallel agenda as a pressure tool to participate in the COP, with the exception of the Iraqi Environmental Monitoring Center’s call to “form a higher council to combat climate change” before going to COP29 to “adopt a unified national strategy with the participation of ministries, local governments, and the Kurdistan Regional Government.”Al-Youm News Agency, “An environmental center calls for the formation of a ‘higher council to combat climate change’ in Iraq”, 11 May 2024, available at https://today-agency.net/Details/10484 The government did move to form the National Youth Climate Change Team in January 2024 by selecting 1,000 volunteers and organizing a simulation of the COP29 conference by the Ministry of Environment. However, there is no evidence that these simulation meetings were held.
- Notably, no mention was made at COP29 of Iraq´s announcement one year earlier of its intention to establish the Green Bank for Sustainable Development.
Considering these observations about Iraq’s participation in the most recent COP, the Iraqi government’s environmental doctrine is still firmly in place.
The views represented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arab Reform Initiative, its staff, or its board.
