This multiplicity of meetings and agreements after the locomotive announcement clearly signals investors are optimistic about a logistical breakthrough.

Central Asia’s Transit Troubles

The C5 countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are rich in natural resources, including the critical minerals sought by the Trump administration, which prominently featured in its dealings with Ukraine, as well as other commodities long coveted by Western industries and investors.

Kazakhstan, the economic backbone of Central Asia, and the rest of the C5 maintain ongoing relations with its two giant neighbors, Russia and China. It shares the world’s longest border with Russia and is the country where China launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013.

C5 populations are also relatively well-educated, with higher levels of educational attainment compared to countries at a similar level of economic development and wealth. AI is a mandatory school subject, as are three languages at schools, in order to attract and utilize foreign expertise and investment. Over two dozen Western universities have branches in Kazakhstan alone, including the Colorado School of Mines, which is recognized as having the best mining training program in the world, and will open its branch this fall.

For the United States, this has been an area that has served as an eager conduit for American soft power for over three decades, broadly supporting America’s international positions, albeit without the usual accompanying investment. This was perhaps most evident when meetings between Tokayev and the Smithsonian Institution and the Education Testing Services, which preceded those with the big spenders.

Since gaining their independence, the C5, and particularly Kazakhstan, have sought to attract Western investment and secure political support to safeguard their sovereignty and economic security against their much larger neighbors, China and Russia. This multi-vector approach treats Western investment not just as a developmental tool, but as a security force multiplier.

Western investment and economic strength are viewed as a means of preventing either Russian or Chinese hegemony, without excluding any great power from participation. This worry isn’t purely hypothetical. Russia, for instance, recently throttled Central Asian exports and imports at its convenience.

Local receptiveness or market conditions have never been the primary obstacles for Western investment or influence in the region. Geography and business practices posed the bigger challenges. Directly reaching the region requires transiting through geopolitical competitors or adversaries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, China, and Russia. Even nearby but not directly adjacent conflicts, such as those in Kashmir and Nagorno-Karabakh, made investors wary. Now that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been resolved, more opportunities abound.

The only route that avoids these political roadblocks is the so-called Middle Corridor, which links the region to the West by crossing the Caspian Sea and then traversing through the southern Caucasus to Turkey or the Black Sea. Scaling up this pathway is desirable both for security reasons and to streamline transportation.

Upfront investment in the ports, roads, and railways required has been deferred since the 1990s, based on earlier Western notions that cheaper routes through Russia or China would always be accessible, regardless of the geopolitical headwinds. However, Russia’s 2022 reinvasion of Ukraine and the launch of China’s Belt and Road 2.0 initiative caused a rethinking in the West concerning the importance of the Middle Corridor. Western public-private partnerships for cooperation and investment in the corridor are on the rise, ranging from MOUs on critical minerals and energy to shipping.

More Central Asian Engagement Needed

While there still needs to be considerable investment in shipping and port facilities on the Caspian Sea, both the Western and Eastern approaches are now nearing geoeconomic maturity. To the West, the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which gave birth to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, a corridor connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey via southern Armenia, enables trade through the Caucasus. TRIPP enables the smooth functioning of the Western half of the Middle Corridor, doubling its connectivity.

This new deal with Kazakhstan enhances trade between the eastern and western halves of the Corridor. This means that more countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia are likely to join, further expanding and benefiting from the Corridor, opening additional economic and diplomatic opportunities for the US and American business.

The new locomotives and logistics deal, if correctly implemented and followed up with sufficient investment in Caspian Sea infrastructure, will eliminate the economic externalities that once made China and Russia the default winners of most competitions within Central Asia.

This isn’t just a boon for Kazakh development or Western companies, but also American foreign policy. Now that upfront costs and externalities have been mitigated, Washington can consciously deploy its greatest foreign policy asset —economic power — in a region that has long been considered beyond America’s core competencies. This not only creates opportunities for new markets and trading partners in a time of tariff-induced economic uncertainty but also provides a new vector for U.S. strategic positioning vis-à-vis Russia and China.

Neither Russia nor China will remain passive, of course. China will act to protect its influence in the region, while Russia will resent America’s presence in what it believes is its own backyard. However, deals can trump wars – a concept clearly understood in the White House.

The first Great Game, the 19th-century battle for influence between Russia and Britain in Central Asia, ended in stalemate. The Russian Empire and later the Soviets realized that India was a bridge too far. The first Great Game began with a series of commercial agreements and British investment in road and railroad infrastructure. America’s ability to win what is starting to look like Round II of this game depends on its ability to invest in strategic minerals, especially uranium, build Caspian infrastructure, and provide steady guidance through diplomacy and economic engagement. Much of the international order and the future of Sino-American competition will hang on developments in this strategic Eurasian heartland. Well played, the results can be profits and progress for all.