The resurgence of the M23 (March 23 movement) rebel group has once again drawn global attention to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The humanitarian crisis—millions displaced, thousands killed, a ‘public health nightmare’ unfolding—rightly dominates headlines. Yet the conflict is having another significant and often overlooked impact: on the environment.

The Kivu provinces, where the fighting is concentrated, are part of one of the world’s most important biodiversity hotspots, the Albertine Rift. Home to endangered species such as eastern lowland and mountain gorillas, as well as two UNESCO World Heritage Sites — Virunga and Kahuzi-Biega National Parks — the region is under increasing environmental pressure. Its protected areas, with resource-rich and rugged terrains, have historically served as ideal rear operating bases for non-state armed groups.

Since the early 1990s, a series of conflicts have led to domino effects and left deep scars on the region’s forests and wildlife. In South Kivu’s Kahuzi-Biega National Park, for example, elephants were nearly wiped out in the early 2000s. Gorilla populations also plummeted, but as the conflict subsided and armed groups gradually withdrew from the park — along with strengthened law enforcement — their numbers began recovering to pre-conflict levels.

The most recent round of conflict threatens to undo these hard-won gains.

Our analysis highlights a sharp increase in deforestation since the recent conflict started in late 2021. This has been driven by a mixture of population displacements, the disruption of conservation law enforcement, and the involvement of different armed actors in the illegal charcoal and timber trade. But the conflict has also impacted the environment in unexpected ways: M23 now appears to be, at least temporarily, supportive of conservation as it tries to project itself as a provider of good governance in the region.

How has the recent conflict with M23 affected the environment?

Virunga National Park, Africa’s oldest national park, lies largely within M23’s operational zone since late 2021. M23 now controls key towns around the park: among others, Kanya Bayonga, Rutshuru, Rwindi, Sake, and Masisi. Furthermore, its main training base is in Tchanzu, a village next to Virunga’s southern sector.

Kahuzi-Biega National Park entered the frontline in February 2025. Towns adjacent to the park’s highland sector — Kabamba, Katana, Kavumu, Miti, and Tchivanga (where the park’s headquarters is located) — have now all fallen under M23 control.

Long before the recent conflict with M23, Virunga National Park served as a vital source of charcoal, firewood (for cooking), and timber for the region. However, the recent fighting has drastically increased pressure on its centuries-old forests. Hundreds of thousands of civilians forced to flee the conflict have sought refuge along the park’s southern border, in Goma. Most of them have no choice but to walk for hours to collect wood from the park for cooking or building shelters.

Our analysis of a tree cover loss dataset shows that the charcoal production zone — an area covering approximately 10,865 hectares (26,868 acres) in the park’s southern sector, east of the Nyiragongo volcano and bordering Goma — experienced an estimated 1,222 hectares (3,019 acres) of tree cover loss in 2023. This spike followed the massive influx of internally displaced people fleeing the fighting. It represents a significant increase compared to a yearly average of 571 hectares (1,410 acres) of tree cover loss from 2019-2022.

Mount Nyiragongo volcano, an iconic feature of the park, has been almost stripped of trees.

The conflict has driven up the demand for charcoal (locally known as makala in Swahili) in Goma, the capital of North Kivu province. In addition to its 1.9 million residents, the city has absorbed at least 800,000 displaced people since the beginning of the conflict. Increased demand for charcoal in Goma, combined with reduced access to charcoal production areas within the Virunga Park — which fell mostly under M23 control — caused a significant rise in charcoal prices. Charcoal traders sought new supplies.

The most accessible alternative? The highland sector of Kahuzi-Biega National Park, located on the opposite side of Lake Kivu, which has been a hotspot for charcoal and timber production since 2019.

Until 2021, the forests of Virunga supplied charcoal to Goma and the one million residents of Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. However, with access to Virunga restricted, Kahuzi-Biega forests began supplying both cities by early 2023. This shift was facilitated by the construction of two informal ports on the southern shores of Lake Kivu: Ihimbi and Kasheke.

Serviced by two ferries and smaller boats, these ports enabled the weekly transport of thousands of sacks of charcoal and timber to Goma.

Our analysis of a tree cover loss dataset reveals a significant uptick in deforestation in Kahuzi-Biega National Park since the establishment of these ports. In 2023, 1,171 hectares (2,893 acres) of tree cover was lost in the charcoal production zone — an area covering around 20,670 hectares (51,123 acres) — in the park adjacent to the ports. This marks a stark increase from the yearly average of 521 hectares (1,287 acres) between 2019-2022.

How are armed actors implicated within these dynamics?

While the conflict is not caused by natural resources inside or outside of protected areas, natural resources have become part of the political economy of conflict. For years, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) — a rebel group that emerged in the wake of the Rwanda genocide — dominated Virunga’s lucrative charcoal trade. However, M23’s territorial gains have shifted the balance of power, reducing the FDLR’s influence inside the park. M23 went on to establish numerous roadblocks to tax the movement of charcoal and timber, carving out a substantial share of the illicit market.

The potential revenues are significant: one report estimates the annual value of Virunga’s charcoal trade at more than $45 million. The FDRL group captured about 26% (or $11.67 million) of this up until 2022.

Yet Virunga’s charcoal receives little media attention compared to other revenue streams. By comparison, the Rubaya coltan mine, which M23 took over in May 2024, has the potential to generate about $9.6 million annually. According to the United Nations Group of Experts’ June 2024 report, M23 also controlled illegal logging in Virunga’s Mikeno sector, producing timber worth from $2.08 million to $2.6 million annually. It gained similar revenues from timber in the Kalengera-Tonbo area.

While armed groups benefit from the charcoal and timber trade, they do not necessarily produce these goods themselves. Instead, they typically allow local communities, for whom these activities are a means of subsistence, to carry out production in their zones of operation. They then impose taxes for ‘protection’ and at roadblocks.

A study found that M23 charges $10 to $30 per charcoal kiln in Virunga and taxes trucks $320 to $700 at roadblocks, while motorcycles pay 10,000 to 15,000 Congolese francs (FC) per trip ($3.50 to $5.25). On the outskirts of refugee camps around the park, the Wazalendo (patriots in Swahili) militias working with the Congolese army, charge people around 1,000 FC ($0.35) per roadblock to access firewood. This represents a considerable sum for most internally displaced people who live in extremely precarious conditions.

Armed groups also severely impact the ability of conservation authorities to carry out their daily work. In both Kahuzi-Biega and Virunga National Parks, the presence of armed groups has disrupted conservation law enforcement at various points over the last three decades. Since 2021, park rangers have struggled to patrol parts of Virunga National Park, leaving some areas vulnerable to illicit exploitation. Monitoring wildlife has become increasingly difficult, with over 200 guards killed in the line of duty since 1996.

Nevertheless, the long-term impacts of the latest bout of conflict in eastern DRC on conservation are unlikely to be straightforward, even if the overall effect is negative. Armed conflict can influence environmental change in non-linear ways, sometimes creating unintended barriers to industrial-scale exploitation. In certain cases, non-state armed groups may even support, or at least pay lip service to, conservation values.

The wider geopolitical context in which M23, and indeed its backer Rwanda, are operating may indeed provide incentives for the group to back conservation.

What are the (geo)politics in all this?

The destruction of Virunga National Park since the recent conflict began has sparked a blame game whereby both sides are seeking to pin responsibility on the other. While neither side wants to be associated with the devastation of a World Heritage Site, each sees an opportunity to tarnish the international reputation of the other.

On the side of the Congolese government, Jules Mayifilua, head of the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature (ICCN), claims that over 50% of Virunga’s animal population has been lost due to the activities of M23. On the other hand, M23 leader Bertrand Bisimwa blames the FDLR, a rival non-state armed group, and the Congolese military for the devastation of the park.

Furthermore, he claims M23 is protecting Virunga.

As previously discussed, M23 has indeed benefited from taxing resources extracted from the park. However, the group is unlikely to want to be associated with this: its leaders are striving to cultivate an image of ‘good governance’ both locally and internationally. They want to show they are more effective rulers than the government in Kinshasa.

Since seizing control of Goma in January 2025, The Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), the political arm of M23, has sought to reinforce this image by encouraging international NGOs to return. They have organized massive press conferences and welcomed foreign media. As part of this PR campaign, it is seeking to demonstrate it can provide effective conservation governance: in late 2022, after tightening control over the upper section of the park’s southern sector,  M23 imposed a strict ban on local populations producing charcoal and practicing agriculture in Virunga. However, this is contradictory: as previously noted, M23 has also profited from the timber trade within the park, undermining its environmental credentials.

The AFC also claimed to have facilitated the repair of the Virunga Energies’ (VE) power lines. Designed to reduce Goma’s dependence on charcoal, these were damaged during the fighting that led to the fall of Goma. The repair was, in fact, made possible by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which negotiated with M23 for VE’s technicians to access the lines.

How the M23 will approach conservation in Kahuzi-Biega National Park is uncertain. Having advanced to Bukavu, the group now controls the park’s highland sector. As in Virunga, it will have to cut a balance between cultivating a pro-conservation image and meeting the needs of the population — many of whom depend heavily on the park’s charcoal. Cutting the charcoal supply from the park entirely may not, therefore, be viable.

For Rwanda, the stakes are even higher. The government has long positioned the country as a global leader in sustainable development and biodiversity conservation — a reputation that could be tarnished if it were seen as contributing to Virunga’s destruction. Moreover, a significant portion of Rwanda’s GDP relies on tourism: revenues from the sector surpassed $600 million in 2023 about 4.3% of its GDP, with gorilla trekking in Volcanoes National Park — which borders Virunga — being the largest contributor.

Tourism is also its main source of foreign exchange. Given that many species, including mountain gorillas, move freely between the two parks, the degradation of Virunga’s ecosystems could jeopardize Rwanda’s ability to sustain its own gorilla populations and, in turn, its economy.

Caught in the geopolitical crossfire, international conservation NGOs face a delicate balancing act. The Virunga Foundation has managed Virunga National Park since 2008 through a public-private partnership (PPP) with ICCN, and the ICCN armed park rangers have at points collaborated with the government’s Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) to combat armed groups within the park.

Now that M23 controls Goma and much of Virunga, including the park headquarters in Rumangabo, it remains to be seen how the park will be managed with a new de facto ruler in the region, and how this can be reconciled with Virunga Foundation’s partnership with the de jure government in Kinshasa. Similarly, Kahuzi-Biega National Park, managed through a PPP between ICCN and the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), could face comparable challenges as M23 consolidates control over the region.

As the conflict in eastern DRC continues to unfold, the question remains: will this war inflict environmental damage on the scale of the Congo wars in the 1990s and early 2000s? The answer is uncertain, but the signs are troubling. The forests, wildlife, and protected areas of eastern DRC remain a silent victim of a conflict that shows no signs of ending soon.

Fergus Simpson is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Antwerp’s Institute of Development Policy (IOB). His research focuses on the intricacies between natural resource conflicts, environmental conservation, and armed mobilization in eastern DR Congo.

Lara Collart is a doctoral researcher at the University of Antwerp’s Institute of Development Policy (IOB). Her research focuses on the nexus between conflict, conservation and natural resource exploitation in eastern DRC, as well as clean cooking.

Joel Masselink is a US-based geographer focused on evaluating the status of protected areas and wildlife using geospatial data science.

Banner image: A mountain gorilla at Virunga National Park. Image courtesy of Fanny Schertzer via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 3.0).

Environmental & rights activists flee and hide as M23 captures DRC’s cities

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